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ABSTRACT 
The most persistently troubling empirical result in the contingent valuation method literature is 
the tendency for hypothetical willingness to pay to overestimate real willingness to pay. Two 
approaches, ex-ante and ex-post, have been developed to mitigate or eliminate the 
overstatement of hypothetical willingness to pay. The ex-ante approach addresses hypothetical 
bias in the survey design stage while the ex-post approach addresses hypothetical bias with 
follow-up questions to the hypothetical willingness to pay question. We find that willingness to 
pay estimates are similar when either the ex-ante or ex-post approach are employed. Our 
results suggest that the approaches should be considered as complements and not substitutes. 
Employing both approaches to mitigate hypothetical bias we estimate that the annual benefits of 
the regional amenities associated with a Green Energy program in North Carolina are $186 
million. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Kyoto Protocol, which went into effect on 16, February 2005 with the participation of 141 
parties, is an effort to mitigate global warming by reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gasses. The United States withdrew from the Protocol in 2002, citing high 
costs, uncertain benefits, and the Bush Administration's preference for voluntary programs 
aimed at greenhouse gas emission reductions. Since then, many corporations, states and 
municipalities have pursued policies to address greenhouse gas emissions. One approach is 
the implementation of Green Energy programs that allow consumers to voluntarily purchase 
energy from non-fossil fuel sources such as wind and solar power (e.g., the North Carolina 
GreenPower Program[1]). By shifting energy production away from sources emitting 
greenhouse gasses, participation in Green Energy programs may contribute to reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions and improvements in regional and local public goods such as air 
quality that leads to health, recreation and passive use benefits. Little is known about the 
economic benefits of these voluntary programs. 
The benefits of policies addressing greenhouse gas emissions can be estimated with revealed 
and stated preference methods. The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a stated preference 
approach for measuring the use and passive use benefits of government policy. Use values 
associated with reduced greenhouse gas emissions might be experienced through improved 
recreation or improvements in one's own health. Much research has compared benefit 
estimates from the CVM and revealed preference methods. Carson et al. (1996) conduct a 
meta-analysis of over one hundred studies that compare CVM and revealed preference method 
estimates and find a positive correlation suggesting the similarity of value estimates across 
valuation methodology. They also find that CVM estimates are about 30% lower, on average, 
than those estimated from revealed preference methods. 
One of the advantages of the CVM is its ability to elicit economic values from people who do not 
directly experience the changes resulting from policy (i.e., passive use values). Preferences for 
ecological integrity, altruism for others and bequests to future generations contribute to passive 
use values. For some policies, passive use values may exist but their contribution to total value 
is not substantial. In these cases revealed preference methods are most appropriate. For some 
policies, however, ignoring the measurement of passive use values would lead to significant 
errors in policy analysis. For example, the benefits of policies that address greenhouse gas 
emissions may be largely determined by passive use values arising from bequests to future 
generations. 
The most persistently troubling empirical result in the CVM literature is hypothetical bias, the 
tendency for hypothetical willingness to pay to overestimate real willingness to pay ( [Cummings 
et al., 1995], [Cummings et al., 1997] and [Blumenschein et al., 1997]). Hypothetical bias occurs 
when CVM respondents state that they will pay for a good when in fact they will not, or they will 
actually pay less, when placed in a similar purchase decision. Hypothetical bias is usually 
attributed to the presence of passive use values and lack of familiarity of paying for policies that 
provide passive use value. However, hypothetical bias has been found in a variety of 
applications including private goods for which no passive use values should exist (List and 
Gallet, 2001). Surprisingly, hypothetical bias is downplayed in much of the CVM literature 
(Harrison, 2006). 
Hypothetical bias arises because answers to CVM willingness to pay questions have no real 
consequences other than a weak connection to the influence of government policy. 
Respondents who state that they would pay for the policy change are not required to actually 
pay. Some respondents may state that they would pay for the policy when, in fact, they would 
not if placed in the real situation. Two reasons for this behavior are an attempt to influence 
policy by signaling their support (e.g., strategic bias, warm glow) and to please the interviewer 
(e.g., yea saying). Hypothetical bias leads to upwardly biased willingness to pay estimates. 
Willingness to pay estimates from the CVM that contain passive use values should be 
considered upper bounds of benefits in the context of benefit-cost analysis unless steps are 
taken to mitigate hypothetical bias. 
Two approaches have been developed to mitigate the overstatement of hypothetical willingness 
to pay. The ex-ante approach addresses hypothetical bias in the survey design stage. 
Respondents are variously (a) told that there are substitutes for the policy available, (b) 
reminded that they are income constrained, (c) asked to answer as if they were placed in an 
actual payment situation and (d) told that hypothetical bias is a significant problem and asked 
not to succumb to this type of respondent error. The ex-post approach addresses hypothetical 
bias with follow-up questions to the hypothetical willingness to pay question. Respondents who 
indicate that they are willing to pay for the policy are asked to rate the certainty they have in 
their willingness to pay. Respondent certainty is measured on a qualitative or quantitative scale 
where the low and high ends of the scale allow respondents to express their degree of certainty 
about their payment. Hypothetical willingness to pay responses are then recoded based on the 
certainty of the respondent. 
Both ex-ante and ex-post approaches have been shown to successfully mitigate and even 
eliminate hypothetical bias. An unaddressed question is the comparative performance of the 
approaches. In this paper we compare ex-ante and ex-post hypothetical bias approaches. Most 
studies that address hypothetical bias compare hypothetical and real willingness to pay. 
Instead, due to research budget limits, we conduct a typical hypothetical CVM survey with a 
scenario that includes a realism and budget reminder in a split-sample treatment. Both samples 
are asked about their payment certainty with a quantitative follow-up certainty question. We 
compare the impact of both approaches separately and together. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The ex-ante approach to hypothetical bias mitigation has evolved from simple reminders about 
economic constraints to elaborate lessons on how to avoid overstating one's willingness to pay. 
Loomis et al. (1994) reminded respondents about substitutes and income constraints and find 
that these reminders do not affect willingness to pay. In Loomis et al. (1996) respondents are 
reminded about income constraints and asked to answer as if they would actually pay. They find 
that the additional survey information moves hypothetical willingness to pay towards real 
willingness to pay. 
Cummings and Taylor (1999), in what is called a “cheap talk” script, define hypothetical bias for 
respondents, explain why it may occur, and ask respondents to behave as if they are in a real 
payment situation. They find that the divergence between hypothetical and real willingness to 
pay is eliminated by the cheap talk script. List (2001) finds that the cheap talk script eliminates 
hypothetical bias for utility maximizers (card show consumers) but not for profit maximizers 
(card show dealers) who may have more familiarity with the value of the product. Brown et al. 
(2003) find that a cheap talk script is able to mitigate hypothetical bias at high bid levels but not 
at low bid levels. Aadland and Caplan (2003) find that a “short-scripted” cheap talk design for 
phone surveys is able to mitigate hypothetical bias for respondents who have strong 
environmental preferences. Lusk (2003) finds that the cheap talk script eliminates hypothetical 
bias for respondents with less knowledge about the goods. 
Studies that have employed the ex-post correction approach have used qualitative and 
quantitative certainty scales. Johannesson et al. (1998) use two certainty categories and 
consider only those respondents who indicate they are “absolutely sure” about payment (the 
other category is “fairly sure”). They find that hypothetical willingness to pay understates real 
willingness to pay when only those who are “absolutely sure” are considered. Blumenschein et 
al. (1998), Blumenschein et al. (2001), and Blumenschein et al. (in press) consider only those 
respondents who indicate they are “definitely sure” about payment (the other category is 
“probably sure”). They find that hypothetical willingness to pay is no different than actual 
willingness to pay when adjusted by respondent certainty. 
A number of studies have used quantitative certainty scales. Champ et al. (1997) considers only 
those respondents who indicate that they are very certain at the highest point of a 10-point 
quantitative scale (i.e., 10 is very certain). The percentage of respondents who are very certain 
about paying and respondents who would actually pay are no different. Champ and Bishop 
(2001) find that those respondents who are certain of their willingness to pay at the 8 or higher 
level on a 10-point scale have similar hypothetical willingness to pay compared to a real 
willingness to pay sample. Poe et al. (2002) and Vossler et al. (2003) find that those 
respondents who are certain of their willingness to pay at the 7 or higher level on a 10-point 
scale have similar probabilities of payment as a real willingness to pay sample. 
Johannesson et al. (1999) used the respondent's self-assessed quantitative certainty ranking to 
estimate a statistical bias function to calibrate the hypothetical yes responses. Calibration of the 
hypothetical yes responses caused no statistical difference between hypothetical and actual yes 
respondents. Other calibration approaches (e.g., CVM-X) have also incorporated 
socioeconomic and laboratory data to calibrate hypothetical responses with actual responses ( 
[Blackburn et al., 1994] and [Fox et al., 1998]). Studies indicate the usefulness of such 
calibration techniques is reduced because the resulting functions appear to be commodity-, 
context-, and even individual-specific ( [Mansfield, 1998], [Fox et al., 1998] and [List and 
Shogren, 2002]). 
A few studies have considered both ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Poe et al. (2002) include 
a short cheap talk script and find that it has no effect on willingness to pay. In addition to the 
short cheap talk script Aadland and Caplan (2003) include a three level qualitative certainty 
rating question but do not recode yes responses. Blumenschein et al. (in press) finds that cheap 
talk does not mitigate hypothetical bias but that certainty ratings eliminates the bias. 
Most recently, Champ et al. (2005) find that cheap talk does not fully mitigate hypothetical bias 
while certainty rating recoding does. Actual donation and cheap talk treatment hypothetical 
donation empirical models are statistically different. Actual donation and certainty rating recoded 
hypothetical donation empirical models are not statistically different. On the other hand, 
willingness to donate estimates are not statistically different between the actual donations ($24), 
cheap talk treatment hypothetical donations ($36) and certainty rating recoded hypothetical 
donations ($30). 
 
3. SURVEY DESIGN 
Our application is to a Green Energy program in North Carolina. Previous CVM studies have 
focused on Green Energy programs in Wisconsin and New York. Both of these studies compare 
hypothetical and real willingness to pay. Champ and Bishop (2001) estimate the benefits of a 
voluntary wind energy program from the Madison Gas and Electric Company. The average 
annual hypothetical willingness to pay for wind power is $101 and actual willingness to pay is 
$59 (pre-2001 dollars). As described above, the hypothetical willingness to pay is equal to the 
real willingness to pay with an ex-post correction. Poe et al. (2002) and Vossler et al. (2003) 
estimate the voluntary willingness to pay for a renewable energy facility operated by Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corporation in New York. Almost 31% are willing to pay a hypothetical $6 
monthly surcharge for the program. After an ex-post correction, 21% are willing to pay, which 
better corresponds to the 20% that actually make a donation. 
In order to develop a realistic willingness to pay scenario we present a hypothetical market in 
which survey respondents are first described the good to be valued. The good generated by the 
Green Energy program is improved air quality in the western North Carolina mountains. Next, 
the change in air quality is described. After the payment mechanism and policy implementation 
rules are described the willingness to pay question is presented. We based our survey design 
on the prior studies that examined willingness to pay for green power ( [Champ and Bishop, 
2001] and [Poe et al., 2002]). 
The first few questions in the survey elicit knowledge, importance and concern about air quality. 
These questions are primarily used to define air quality and describe threats to air quality.[2] 
The hypothetical portion of the survey begins with a question introducing a “Green Energy” 
program (Appendix A). Respondents are told that the hypothetical program is similar to a real 
program called the North Carolina GreenPower program. Only a few respondents had already 
heard about the GreenPower program. The next question states that the hypothetical Green 
Energy program would offer all North Carolina utility customers power generated from 
renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. Over 80% of the respondents are very 
interested or somewhat interested in this program. Respondents are told that the goal of the 
program is to get 10% of all North Carolina utility customers to sign up. Almost three quarters of 
the sample think that it is very likely or somewhat likely that 10% would sign up. This result 
indicates that most respondents find this component of the scenario credible. 
The next question defines the scope of the program based on the dimensions of air quality. 
Respondents are told that if 10% of all North Carolina utility customers sign up, air quality in the 
western North Carolina mountains would improve. Visibility would increase by about Δq miles, 
the number of streams and acres of forests impacted by acid rain would decrease by about Δq 
percent, and the number of people who get sick because of breathing problems would decrease 
by about Δq percent. There are three scope versions that are randomly assigned to 
respondents: Δq = 2, 10 and 20. Respondents are asked for their opinion about the likelihood of 
achieving the air pollution goal in order to determine if they find the scenario credible. Over 
three quarters think that it is very likely or somewhat likely that the goal will be reached. These 
frequencies do not vary significantly by the scope of the program. 
We adopt the same payment vehicle used by Champ and Bishop (2001) and Poe et al. (2002)—
a voluntary surcharge to the monthly utility bill. The voluntary contribution is a lower bound on 
maximum willingness to pay (Champ et al., 1997). The magnitude and rationale for the 
additional monthly fee, is described: “In a voluntary Green Energy program, households that 
choose to participate would pay an extra A dollar fee each month with their power bills. This fee 
would be fixed and not tax-deductible. The fee would cover the higher production costs of green 
energy.” The fee was randomly assigned to respondents and took on one of four values: A = 5, 
15, 30, and 50. Respondents were then asked for their average monthly power bill in order to 
get them to assess the impact the monthly fee would have. The average monthly power bill is 
over $100. 
Respondents were then described the policy implementation rule that includes the provision 
point design to minimize free riding ([Poe et al., 2002] and [Rose et al., 2002]): “If you signed up 
for the Green Energy program and were not satisfied you could cancel the program at any time. 
But if less than 10% signed up, the Green Energy program would not have enough customers to 
make it cost effective. The program would stop and you would owe no money.” A split-sample 
survey design is used in which one-third of all respondents were reminded about their budget 
constraint and substitutes and asked to think of the hypothetical decision as if it were a real 
decision: “Now please think about the next question just like it was a real decision. If you signed 
up for the program you would have A dollars less each month to spend on other things.” This 
script is similar in length to the so-called “short scripted” cheap talk design of Aadland and 
Caplan (2003). We refer to this as the REMINDER version since it does not incorporate most of 
the cheap talk characteristics found in Cummings and Taylor (1999). 
The willingness to pay question is then presented: “Suppose you were given the opportunity to 
participate in the Green Energy program for an extra fee of A dollars each month. Would you 
sign up for the Green Energy program?”3 In contrast to previous hypothetical bias research we 
allow respondents to give yes, no and don’t know responses. Respondents are then asked the 
follow-up questions about how certain they are about their willingness to pay response: “We 
would like to know how sure you are that you would sign up. On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is 
very uncertain and 10 is very certain, how certain are you that you would sign up?” 
Respondents who would (would not) sign up at the monthly fee are asked for the most important 
reason why. The most popular reasons for signing up are for a better environment, better 
human health, for future generations, and because “it is the right thing to do.” The most popular 
reasons for not signing up are the cost is too high, not enough income, and “I don’t trust the 
power companies.” 
 
4. DATA 
During November 2002 we conducted a telephone survey of North Carolina residents. The 
North Carolina GreenPower program is available statewide, so the sample was randomly taken 
from all 100 North Carolina counties. The survey treatments were randomly distributed across 
respondents. We completed interviews with 431 respondents and achieved a response rate of 
61%. Due to item nonresponse, data from 353 respondents are included in the empirical 
analysis. 
In the sample without the REMINDER the percentage of raw yes responses falls from 61 to 40% 
as the monthly fee rises from $5 to $50 (Table 1). With the REMINDER the percentage of yes 
responses falls from 55 to 24% as the fee rises from $5 to $50. At the two higher fees, the 
REMINDER leads to yes percentages that are substantially lower compared to the lower fees. 
This result is consistent with Brown et al. (2003) who find that cheap talk is most effective at 
high bids. 
 
 
 
 
Twenty four percent of all yes responses are certain of their response at the highest level (10). 
Nineteen percent, 31, and 5% are certain at the 7, 8, and 9 levels. As in Poe et al. (2002), we 
define those who give a 7 or higher as those who are sure about their willingness to pay.[4] 
Since we include a don’t know response option, we recode uncertain yes responses to don’t 
know responses instead of no responses. When the uncertain yes responses are recoded to 
don’t know responses, the percentage of yes responses falls from 52 to 36% without the 
REMINDER treatment. With the REMINDER treatment the percentage of certain yes responses 
falls from 52 to 16% as the monthly fee rises from $5 to $50. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Willingness to pay, WTP, is the difference in expenditure functions: 
(1) 
 
where Δq is the increase in air quality. The yes responses to the willingness to pay question 
depend on whether willingness to pay is greater than the monthly fee (i.e., yes if WTP ≥ A). The 
probability of a yes response is estimated with the multinomial logit model: 
(2) 
 
where log A is the natural log of the fee amount, β a vector of coefficients, Xi a vector of 
independent variables (including a constant), i = 1, …, n respondents, and j ∈ k. The k = 3 
choices are: k is equal to 1 if yes, 2 if no, and 3 if don’t know. The coefficients for the base case 
(β1), are normalized to zero. The multinomial logit model produces separate coefficient vectors 
for the no (β2) and don’t know (β3) responses. 
Willingness to pay is estimated from the censored logit coefficients. The coefficient on the fee 
amount, α, is equal to Cameron's 1/κ (Cameron, 1988). Since the dollar amount is varied across 
respondents, 1/κ can be identified and willingness to pay can be recovered from the estimated 
coefficients: 
(3) 
 
when don’t know responses are discarded by the researcher and 
(4) 
 
when the don’t know response coefficient vector is constrained to be equal to the no response 
coefficient vector ( [Carson et al., 1996] and [Groothuis and Whitehead, 2002]). Standard errors 
for the willingness to pay estimates are constructed using the delta method ( [Cameron, 
1991] and [Greene, 1997]). When the natural log of the fee amount is used in the regression 
WTP is the median of the willingness to pay distribution. Median willingness to pay is the dollar 
amount that 50% of respondents would agree to pay. Median willingness to pay is calculated 
from the estimates of the regression coefficients at the mean of the independent variables, . 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The multinomial logit models are presented in Table 2. The independent variables include the 
monthly fee, scope, a dummy variable for the ex-ante REMINDER version (REMINDER = 1, 0 
otherwise) and household income (in thousands). The average household income, INCOME, is 
$53 thousand. The natural log of the monthly fee (log A) is used because it performed 
significantly better according to likelihood ratio tests.[5] We present four models. With the raw 
yes responses, the unconstrained multinomial model estimates separate coefficient vectors for 
the no and don’t know responses. The constrained model is estimated with the no and don’t 
know response coefficient vectors constrained equal. Unconstrained and constrained models 
are estimated when the uncertain yes responses are recoded as don’t know responses. 
 
 
 
The probability that the respondent is not willing to pay the monthly fee increases with the 
magnitude of the fee. The probability that the respondent does not know if they are willing to pay 
the monthly fee also increases with the magnitude of the fee. The coefficient on log A is positive 
and statistically significant in each model. This result indicates that respondents behave 
rationally with respect to cost and allows the estimation of the monthly willingness to pay for the 
Green Energy program. The effect of income on the probability of no and don’t know responses 
is negative except in the unconstrained yes response coefficient vector. This indicates that the 
air quality improvements resulting from the Green Energy program are normal goods. 
The scope test is conducted by including two dummy variables for the Δq = 10 and Δq = 20 
versions. SCOPE = 10 is equal to 1 if the respondent received the Δq = 10 version and zero 
otherwise. SCOPE = 20 is equal to 1 if the respondent received the Δq = 20 version and zero 
otherwise. In general willingness to pay is sensitive to the scope of the policy. In the 
unconstrained yes response model the probability of a no response falls relative to the low 
scope version when Δq = 20. There is no difference in the probability of a no response when 
comparing Δq = 2 to Δq = 10. The probability of a don’t know response is lower when scope 
increases. In the constrained model, the probability of no and don’t know responses falls when 
scope is equal to 10 and 20 but the coefficients between the two high scope versions are not 
statistically different. Results are similar when the uncertain yes responses are recoded to don’t 
know responses. 
The coefficient on the REMINDER dummy variable is not statistically significant in the 
unconstrained yes response model. When the no and don’t know response coefficient vectors 
are constrained to be equal the REMINDER coefficient is statistically significant at the p = 0.10 
level, increasing the probability of a no or don’t know response. When the uncertain yes 
responses are recoded to don’t know responses the coefficient on the REMINDER dummy 
variable is statistically significant in the unconstrained model at the p = 0.05 and p = 0.10 levels 
for the no and don’t know responses. When the no and don’t know response coefficient vectors 
are constrained equal the REMINDER coefficient is statistically significant at the p = 0.05 level, 
increasing the probability of a no or don’t know response. 
 
7. WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
Willingness to pay estimates from the four models are presented in Table 3. Six different 
scenario estimates are presented for each model: willingness to pay at each of the three scope 
levels with and without the ex-ante REMINDER treatment. Scenarios 1–3 are without the 
REMINDER treatment and SCOPE = 2, 10 and 20. Scenarios 4–6 are with the REMINDER 
treatment and SCOPE = 2, 10 and 20. For brevity we focus our discussion on the willingness to 
pay estimates from the constrained models 2 and 4. 
 
 
 
The willingness to pay estimates from the yes versus no and don’t know response Model 2 
without the REMINDER are likely prone to hypothetical bias. In Scenarios 1–3 of Model 2 when 
hypothetical bias is ignored, willingness to pay is $22 when SCOPE = 2 and greater than the 
highest bid amount when SCOPE = 10 and SCOPE = 20. When the REMINDER is used in 
Model 2 Scenarios 4–6 the willingness to pay estimates fall by more than 50% at each scope 
level relative to the willingness to pay estimates in Model 2 Scenarios 1–3. 
When the uncertain yes responses are recoded to don’t know responses, the willingness to pay 
estimates from Model 4 Scenarios 1–6 also fall by more than 50% relative to the willingness to 
pay estimates in the corresponding Model 2 scenarios. For example in Scenario 1, willingness 
to pay is $12 when the uncertain yes responses are recoded and $22 when they are not. When 
both approaches are used in Model 4, Scenarios 4–6, willingness to pay estimates are about 
one-third of the willingness to pay estimates when hypothetical bias is ignored in Model 2, 
Scenarios 1–3. 
We test for differences in willingness to pay estimates in the ex-ante and ex-post correction 
methods by constructing t-tests with the standard errors estimated from the delta method for the 
following three willingness to pay comparisons: (1) Model 2, Scenario 4 versus Model 4, 
Scenario 1, (2) Model 2, Scenario 5 versus Model 4, Scenario 2 and (3) Model 2, Scenario 6 
versus Model 4, Scenario 3. The three differences in willingness to pay are not statistically 
different from zero. The differences are −$1.30 (t = 0.73), −$0.57 (t = 0.04) and $0.36 (t = 0.02). 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We find that willingness to pay estimates are similar when either the ex-ante or ex-post 
hypothetical bias mitigation approaches are used. However, it seems reasonable to remind 
respondents about their budget constraint and to answer the willingness to pay question as if it 
was real. In fact, in this study the reminder is more effective when uncertain yes respondents 
are recoded to don’t know responses. This suggests that ex-ante and ex-post approaches to 
mitigating hypothetical bias are complements instead of substitutes. In other words, it may be 
that only the relatively certain respondents are those who heed the call to tell the truth. This 
interpretation may help explain why the Loomis et al. (1994) ex-ante reminder did not affect 
willingness to pay and why the Loomis et al. (1996) ex-ante reminder did not cause hypothetical 
willingness to pay to equate to real willingness to pay. If ex-ante and ex-post approaches are 
complements, studies that employ only one of the approaches in an attempt to mitigate 
hypothetical bias may still overstate willingness to pay. 
The complementarity between ex-ante and ex-post approaches was furthered explored by 
examining the influence of the reminder text on (1) the 1–10 certainty responses and (2) the 
likelihood that yes respondents are above or below the level 7 cut-off. In a variety of tests we 
find no statistically significant evidence that the reminder text affects certainty responses (p = 
0.10). However, we note that our sample of yes respondents is relatively small, n = 151, and 
only n = 31 of these responded with a certainty level less than 7. Larger samples and more 
elaborate reminder text might lead to the conclusion that the ex-ante and ex-post approaches 
are substitutes. The substitutability of the ex-ante and ex-post approaches warrants further 
research. 
Combining both ex-ante and ex-post approaches to mitigating hypothetical bias has 
considerable promise in addressing the most serious of criticisms of the contingent valuation 
method. This paper contributes to this line of research by comparing the two approaches to 
mitigating hypothetical bias. Future studies should examine cheap talk, budget, and other ex-
ante reminders in conjunction with certainty rating recodes instead of as a competing approach. 
A major impediment to the implementation of cheap talk script is its length, especially in the 
more commonly used mail and telephone surveys. We find that the probability of a yes 
response falls when a short reminder is included as in Aadland and Caplan (2003). This is in 
contrast to other studies that examine short cheap talk scripts. This result provides hope that 
shorter cheap talk scripts could be a practical method for mitigating hypothetical bias. 
Our application is to a Green Energy program in North Carolina. Without a real willingness to 
pay value with which to compare hypothetical willingness to pay the most conservative WTP 
estimate, adjusted with both the ex-ante and ex-post approaches, should be used in benefit-cost 
analysis. Our most conservative willingness to pay estimate is $4.24/household/month for the 
least ambitious scope version. The annual willingness to pay is $51 which is very similar to the 
annual willingness to pay for a wind energy program found by Champ and Bishop (2001). The 
2000 U.S. Census estimates that there are about 3.5 million housing units in North Carolina in 
2000. Aggregating the annual willingness to pay across the housing units yields an estimate of 
the annual benefits of the Green Energy program: $186 million (2002 dollars). According to our 
results, the benefits of the regional amenities associated with a Green Energy program in North 
Carolina are substantial. Future research should estimate the benefits of other voluntary Green 
Energy programs and compare the benefits to their costs. 
 
  
APPENDIX A. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
10. Now consider a hypothetical Green Energy program. The hypothetical program is based on 
a real program that is being considered right now by power plants that affect air quality in North 
Carolina. How much have you heard about the real program, called the North Carolina 
GreenPower program? Have you heard a lot, some, a little or nothing? 
• A lot 
• Some 
• A little 
• Nothing 
11. With the hypothetical Green Energy Program all utility companies in North Carolina would 
offer their customers power generated from renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. 
How interested are you in the Green Energy program? Are you very interested, somewhat 
interested or not interested? 
• Very interested 
• Somewhat interested 
• Not interested → we would still like your opinions about the following questions 
12. The goal of this program would be to get 10% of all North Carolina utility customers to sign 
up. In your opinion, how likely do you think it is that 10% of all North Carolina utility customers 
would sign up? Do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat not likely, or not likely 
at all? 
• Very likely 
• Somewhat likely 
• Somewhat not likely 
• Not likely at all 
13. If 10% of all North Carolina utility customers sign up, air quality in the western North 
Carolina mountains would improve. Visibility would increase by about Δq6 miles, the number of 
streams and acres of forest impacted by acid rain would decrease by about Δq percent, and the 
number of people who get sick because of breathing problems would decrease by about Δq 
percent. In your opinion, how likely do you think it is that these goals would be reached? Do you 
think it is very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat not likely, or not likely at all? 
• Very likely 
• Somewhat likely 
• Somewhat not likely 
• Not likely at all 
14. In a voluntary Green Energy program households that choose to participate would pay an 
extra A7 dollar fee each month with their power bills. This fee would be fixed and not tax-
deductible. The fee would cover the higher production costs of green energy. Not including 
water, what is your average monthly power bill now? 
• $___ 
15. If you signed up for the Green Energy program and were not satisfied you could cancel the 
program at any time. But if less than 10% signed up, the Green Energy program would not have 
enough customers to make it cost effective. The program would stop and you would owe no 
money. Suppose you were given the opportunity to participate in the Green Energy program for 
an extra fee of A dollars each month. Now, please think about this question just like it was a real 
decision. If you signed up for the program, you would have A dollars less each month to spend 
on other things. Would you sign up for the Green Energy program? 
• Yes 
• No → Skip 16 
• Don’t know → Skip 16 
16. We would like to know how sure you are that you would sign up. On a scale of 1–10 where 1 
is very uncertain and 10 is very certain, how certain are you that you would sign up? 
• ___(Record response, 1–0). 
 
 
  
NOTES 
1  See http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/locator/. 
2  We did not mention global warming due to the political controversy surrounding the issue in 
2002. 
3  We note that it was not possible to observe actual participation by respondents in this case. 
The lack of an internal real willingness to pay benchmark is unfortunate, but our relative findings 
remain instructive when taken in conjunction with previous work on this issue. 
4  Recoding all respondents who are certain at the level 8 and above would result in 29 fewer 
yes responses. Median willingness to pay estimates at this recoding level are not statistically 
different from zero as in Loomis and Ekstrand (1998). 
5  Multinomial logit results with a linear fee amount are qualitatively similar. These are available 
upon request. 
6  Δq = 2, 10 or 20. 
7  A = 5, 15, 30 or 50. 
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